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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
ACCESS TO MEDICAID: RECOGNIZING RIGHTS TO ENSURE 
ACCESS TO CARE AND SERVICES 
Colleen Nicholson* 
The Supreme Court has defined Medicaid as “a cooperative 
federal-state program through which the Federal Government 
provides financial assistance to States so that they may furnish 
medical care to needy individuals.”1 In June 2012, the Court found 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (PPACA) 
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional.2 The Court took issue with 
the threat to withhold all of a state’s Medicaid funding if they did 
not comply with the expansion, finding it coercive and a 
fundamental shift in the Medicaid paradigm.3 However, Medicaid 
in its current form may not always be effective at providing 
beneficiaries with timely access to the care to which they are 
entitled.4 For Medicaid to function as intended, Congress must 
amend the definition of “medical assistance” in the Medicaid Act 
and give Medicaid beneficiaries and providers an enforceable 
federal right to sue the states when they do not set provider 
reimbursement rates at levels that are adequate to attract 
sufficient Medicaid providers to provide enumerated services for 
enrollees. 
Medicaid provider reimbursement rates are so low in some 
states that current Medicaid beneficiaries may be unable to 
receive covered medical care. For example, because of low 
reimbursement rates, at one time there were no providers of early 
and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services 
* J.D. Candidate, December 2013, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n., 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006).
2. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603-04
(2012). 
3. See id. at 2601-08.
4. See 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26344 (May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447)
(noting that access to Medicaid health care and services at the state level is in need of 
federal guidance). 
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(EPSDT) in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.5 EPSDT services are basic 
pediatric services that states are required to provide to eligible 
beneficiaries who request them.6 The current recession has 
exacerbated this problem, as states cut provider reimbursement 
rates in an attempt to cover increasing numbers of beneficiaries 
with dwindling state finances.7 Thirty-nine states cut Medicaid 
reimbursement rates in 2010, and fifteen of those states also 
reduced or eliminated benefits.8 If the current funding levels 
leave Medicaid beneficiaries without the statutorily mandated 
reasonable access to the medical care to which they are entitled, 
reforms are needed to bring Medicaid into compliance with its 
programmatic goals. 
To strengthen Medicaid as a program that provides access to 
care for beneficiaries, the definition of medical assistance in the 
Medicaid Act should be clarified. Over the past fifteen years, a 
circuit split has emerged as to whether “medical assistance,” a 
term used throughout the Act, referred to the actual provision of 
services, to reimbursement for services actually provided, or to 
both.9 Congress attempted to resolve the split, defining medical 
assistance in PPACA as both the funds provided to pay for medical 
care and services, and the care and services themselves.10 This 
amendment seemingly clarified that the states have an obligation 
to provide access to covered services for beneficiaries rather than 
merely reimburse providers for services provided. Despite rather 
explicit congressional intent, the circuit split persists and must be 
resolved.11 Otherwise, the states have no obligation to ensure that 
5. See Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2006).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (2006).
7. See OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2011 ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR 
MEDICAID 17–18 (2011). 
8. Martina Brendel, Note, When a Door Closes, a Window Opens: Using Preemption 
to Challenge State Medicaid Cutbacks, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 925, 925–26 (2011). 
9. Compare Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that medical assistance did not refer to actual medical services), and Mandy 
R. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
Medicaid Act requires reimbursement for covered services, not the direct provision of 
services by the state), with Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 81, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(assuming medical assistance included services), and Doe v. Chiles, 136 F. 3d 709, 714, 717 
(11th Cir. 1998) (interpreting medical assistance as services). 
10. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a) (West 2011); see also H.R. Rep. No. 111–299, pt. 1, at
649–50 (2009). 
11. Compare John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 360 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The definition of
‘medical assistance’ has changed since we decided Westside Mothers II, but the new 
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Medicaid beneficiaries are able to receive care, seemingly 
frustrating Medicaid’s aim. Therefore, Congress must further 
amend the definition of medical assistance to clarify that states 
have an obligation to provide Medicaid beneficiaries with access to 
certain covered services. 
In addition to a conclusive recognition of what states’ 
Medicaid obligations are, Medicaid beneficiaries and providers 
need an enforceable right to sue the states and challenge state 
reimbursement levels. Because states may not always set 
reimbursement at rates adequate to provide beneficiaries with 
access to care, there needs to be some legal avenue for 
beneficiaries to challenge the states when these rates are set at 
inadequate levels.12 Possible vehicles include the reasonable 
promptness,13 availability,14 and equal access provisions of the 
Medicaid Act,15 but the circuits are split on whether, and for 
whom, these provisions create rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.16 Therefore, Congress must also clarify that at least one of 
these § 1983 avenues is available to challenge inadequate 
Medicaid provider reimbursement rates. 
definition does not affect this holding because a state may still fulfill its Medicaid 
obligations by paying for services.”), with Disability Rights N. J., Inc. v. Velez, No. 06–4723, 
2010 WL 5055820, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2010) (holding that because of the change in law, “it 
would result in manifest injustice were we to maintain our previous interpretation of 
‘medical assistance’”). 
12. See Sean Jessee, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why the 
Equal Access Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY L.J. 791, 811 (2009). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2006) (stating that a state plan for medical assistance must
provide requested assistance with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals). 
14. Id. § 1396a(a)(10) (describing the minimum medical services a state plan for
medical assistance must make available for eligible beneficiaries). 
15. Id. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (requiring that a state plan assures “that payments are
consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough 
providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that 
such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area”). 
16. Compare Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the equal access provision does not create an enforceable right for Medicaid 
beneficiaries or providers), and Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 
910 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting the reasonable promptness provision to entitle providers to 
reasonably prompt reimbursement for actual services provided rather than a right for 
beneficiaries to have reasonably prompt access to covered medical care), with Sabree ex rel. 
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that Medicaid beneficiaries 
have enforceable rights under the reasonable promptness and availability provisions), 
Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that the reasonable promptness 
provision creates a § 1983 cause of action), and Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 719 (11th Cir. 
1998) (holding that Medicaid beneficiaries have a federal right enforceable under § 1983 to 
reasonably prompt care). 
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Without a concrete, universally recognized enforceable right, 
Medicaid beneficiaries and providers have no means of 
challenging the states for failing to fulfill their Medicaid 
responsibilities, short of calling on the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to withhold some or all of the state’s Medicaid 
funding until the Secretary is confident that the state’s plan for 
medical assistance will comply with all of the statutory 
provisions.17 Such a course of action is undesirable, as it could lead 
to even less access to care for current Medicaid beneficiaries in the 
affected states. Therefore, beneficiaries should be able to bring an 
action against the state to challenge state provider reimbursement 
rates if the rates do not attract enough providers to offer care in 
compliance with the reasonable promptness, availability, or equal 
access clauses. 
Congress should amend the definition of “medical assistance” 
in the Medicaid Act and explicitly recognize enforceable rights in 
the reasonable promptness, availability, and equal access 
provisions to clarify what states are required to do under Medicaid 
and allow beneficiaries to challenge states that do not meet their 
obligations. The Court struck down the Medicaid expansion as an 
irresistible “gun to the head” in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius because, according to the 
Court, the expansion changed the fundamental nature of 
Medicaid and created an entirely new program.18 However, the 
proposed amended definition of “medical assistance,” coupled with 
recognition of rights enforceable through § 1983, would merely 
further the aims of Medicaid. Medicaid was designed to “furnish 
medical care to needy individuals,”19 not provide reimbursement 
to medical providers. Therefore, providing individual Medicaid 
beneficiaries and providers with an enforceable right to sue the 
states, and giving the states a greater incentive to reign in 
provider reimbursement rates, would make Medicaid a program 
worth expanding, should Congress find a constitutional way to do 
so. 
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006) (describing the Secretary of Health and Human
Services’ ability to withhold payments to states after finding a lack of compliance with 
Medicaid provisions). 
18. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
19. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n., 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990).
